



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT AND COALITION WARFIGHTING
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5 October 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, JOINT STAFF J-7/JEDD

Subj: Proposed JP 3-XX, *Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO)*

1. The enclosed front-end analysis (FEA) on the subject proposal from US European Command (USEUCOM) was developed based on research and informal inputs from combatant commands, Services, and other sources, to include, existing joint doctrine; related Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) and Department of Defense (DOD) directives; lessons learned files from the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS); and extant and emerging joint, multinational, multi-Service, and Service doctrine and procedures. Accordingly, the Joint Doctrine Support Division recommends:

a. Adding guidance on responding to mass atrocities in JP 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* and JP 3-29 *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

b. Against developing a standalone Joint Publication on "Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations."

c. Approving this front-end analysis for briefing at the 48th Joint Doctrine Planning Conference.

2. The JCW Joint Doctrine Support Division POC for this FEA is Major Taylor White, DSN: 668-7966, Comm (757) 203-7966.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Charles K. Hardy".

CHARLES K. HARDY
COL, U.S. Army
Chief, Joint Doctrine Support Division

Enclosure:

Front-End Analysis for United States European Command Proposal for JP 3-XX, *Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations*

-Front End Analysis-
JP 3-XX, Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations

1. Background

a. This front-end analysis (FEA) is provided in response to a proposal by the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to develop a joint publication (JP) for “Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations.”

b. The proposed scope of the new JP is: “This publication will provide joint doctrine for the planning, coordination, and execution of operations to prevent and respond to mass atrocities with DOD military forces and other US Government agencies; foreign governments; intergovernmental organizations; and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

c. The proposal nominates USEUCOM as the lead agent and the Joint Staff (JS) J-5 as the Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor.

d. This front end analysis provides research and discussion to determine if the subject matter meets the definition of joint doctrine, if a doctrinal void exists, and if the proposed doctrine is based on extant capabilities.

2. Methodology. Research included a search of applicable approved and emerging joint, multinational, multi-Service, and Service doctrine and procedures; exercise issues and observations; related joint concepts; experimentation results; doctrine change recommendations; Joint Staff directives; trip reports; assessment reports; and Service and joint lessons learned databases.

3. Summary

a. The purpose of the USEUCOM proposal was to recommend the development of a joint doctrine publication for mass atrocity prevention and response operations (MAPRO). The intent for this joint doctrine will be to standardize terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all U.S. forces in view of a perceived doctrinal void in this emergent and evolving operational domain.”

b. Strategic guidance, to include Presidential Study Directive – 10 (PSD-10), the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), 2011 National Military Strategy, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2010 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) all identify a core United States (US) national security interest in preventing and responding to mass atrocity situations. According to the proposal: “An approved joint doctrinal publication will fill the gap between national guidance and existing DOD [Department of Defense]

capabilities by providing operationally accepted terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting MAPRO.”

4. Analysis

a. **Strategic Guidance.** There is significant discussion at the national policy level on preventing and stopping mass atrocities.

(1) National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010. Under the Peacekeeping and Armed Conflict section of Chapter III “Advancing Our Interests”, the NSS provides policy guidance on preventing mass atrocities: “Prevent Genocide and Mass Atrocities: The United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect.” In so doing, we have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders. The United States is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. In the event that prevention fails, the United States will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.”

(2) Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (4 August 2011). This document directs “the establishment of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board within 120 days from the date of this Presidential Study Directive. The primary purpose of the Atrocities Prevention Board shall be to coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. By institutionalizing the coordination of atrocity prevention, we can ensure: (1) that our national security apparatus recognizes and is responsive to early indicators of potential atrocities; (2) that departments and agencies develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response strategies in a manner that allows “red flags” and dissent to be raised to decision makers; (3) that we increase the capacity and develop doctrine for our foreign service, armed services, development professionals, and other actors to engage in the full spectrum of smart prevention activities; and (4) that we are optimally positioned to work with our allies in order to ensure that the burdens of atrocity prevention and response are appropriately shared.”

(3) Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010. In the discussion of Defense Strategies, under “Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies” the Quadrennial Defense Review states the US must be prepared to respond in support of US national interests

including “Preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.”

(4) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). This classified document provides general and specific planning guidance to combatant commanders for development of campaign and contingency plans. One of the global end states listed in the document states: “Innocent civilians and vulnerable populations are protected from the threat of mass atrocities or genocide, and foreign authorities are adequately supported to prevent mass atrocities and to mitigate the consequences of catastrophic events.” In addition, general planning guidance in the GEF directs: “Civilian Protection. Plans will identify and assess potential significant human rights and civilian protection concerns that could be impacted by USG [United States Government] and/or partner operations. Plan to minimize and mitigate the negative consequences of such operations to civilian populations. Combatant commanders should identify and monitor indications and warnings of potential mass atrocities occurring within their AORs [areas of responsibility]. Planners shall consider the likelihood of, and potential for, executing operations to prevent mass atrocities.” Specific planning guidance for combatant commands is also provided in the GEF.

b. Other Resources

(1) US Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 (19 August 2010). The section on foreign humanitarian assistance states Army forces must be prepared to conduct mass atrocity response operations (MARO) as part of full-spectrum operations. MARO requires combined arms formations and unity of purpose with interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to create a secure environment, establish rule of law, and build security and government organizations able to maintain stability and prevent further atrocities.

(2) MARO Military Planning Handbook (2010). Developed by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University and the US Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, this handbook serves as the basis for the USEUCOM proposal and is the only document to attempt to define MARO as a unique military operation.

(a) MARO Military Planning Handbook defines MARO: a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants.

(b) MARO Military Planning Handbook provides the following three distinctions of a MARO situation.

1. Multiparty Dynamic. A MARO situation is a multiparty affair, complicating planning and operations. At least three major categories of actors- the perpetrators or violence, the victims of violence, and the interveners- interact with results that are difficult to predict.

2. Illusion of Impartiality. The intervener may be acting for what he considers impartial reasons (e.g., defense of human rights), unrelated to the identities of the parties or the underlying conflicts. Nonetheless, the perpetrators of violence and victims as well will perceive an intervening force as anything but impartial.

3. Escalatory Dynamic. The mass killing of civilians has the potential for rapid escalation based on numerous factors that raise acute challenges for an intervening force.

c. **Joint Doctrine (Current, Assessment, and Revision)**. MAPRO and MARO are not mentioned or addressed in current or draft joint doctrine. Two current and six draft joint publications (JPs) mention protection of civilians, one draft publication mentions mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, one current and three draft JPs mention genocide and no JPs mention mass murder.

(1) Based on the definitions in the MARO Military Planning Handbook, research was conducted across joint doctrine for fundamental principles that would guide the employment of US military forces while responding to a mass atrocity.

(2) Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

(a) Draft JP 3.07 Stability Operations. Chapter III “Stability Operations Functions”, Section A, “Security” discusses protection of civilians and provides considerations for mass atrocities.

1. Protection of Civilians. The joint force may be called upon to provide protection for civilians if the HN is unable or unwilling to provide such protection. The protection of civilians from physical violence, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, is vital. Civilians and international workers, refugee camps, and other facilities for dislocated civilians (DCs) may provide attractive targets for adversaries, particularly in areas of historic ethnic or cultural conflict. Security forces are charged with the protection of such facilities, while also enabling access by NGOs, IGOs, and others providing humanitarian assistance to DCs.

2. Mass Atrocities. Department of State (DOS) leads efforts to detect and prevent genocide around the globe. Preventing or halting genocide, however, may require the employment of a joint force to deter or halt ongoing atrocities. Any such intervention will require a significant stability operations component. Additionally, when operating in fragile states, joint forces may be critical to detecting early warning signs, preventing or deterring genocide.

a. Military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process can help identify early warning indicators and describe important contextual factors, such as the nature of belligerents and the status of the civilian population, connections between leaders and followers, and the means of violence.

b. Development of security institutions, including vetting of security and intelligence personnel as well as training and other assistance, should include some emphasis on preventing and countering mass atrocities and genocide. Key leader engagement is particularly important in this area.

c. JFCs should ensure rules of engagement (ROE) specify guidance to units or individuals that encounter genocide or other mass atrocities, as well as human rights violations that could lead to such atrocities.

3. The JP 3-07 final coordination joint working group (JWG) rejected proposed comments from USEUCOM to add discussion of MARO to the publication.

a. USEUCOM justification: “MARO is an upcoming mission that is currently in the draft Army Operating Concept. We recommend updating Joint doctrine to include this”.

b. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) rejected the comments, rationale provided, “redundant to discussion on mass atrocities”.

(3) JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration.

(a) Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type has unique characteristics. For example,

FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace operations (PO), but each has its own strategic end state. Military CDRs must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military CDRs conducting FHA simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous military operations.

(b) FHA missions conducted by US military forces span the entire range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. The following missions are common in FHA operations: (A single FHA operation may well contain more than one of these missions.)

1. Relief Missions. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims.

2. Dislocated Civilian Support Missions. These missions are specifically designed to support the assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. A “dislocated civilian” is a broad term primarily used by DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person (IDP), a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. These persons may be victims of conflict, natural, or man-made disaster.

3. Security Missions. These missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community.

4. Technical Assistance and Support Functions. An FHA force may, for a short term, support tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply distribution management and delivery, port operations, base operating support, emergency medical care, search and rescue (SAR), and humanitarian de-mining assistance.

5. Foreign Consequence Management. FCM is DOD assistance provided by the USG to a host nation (HN) to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN attack or event and to restore essential government services.

(4) JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations. PO are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. There are five types of Peace Operations.

(a) Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate

implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

(b) Peace Enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

1. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations

a. Consent. In PEO, consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement, although some parties may extend it. At the strategic level, consent should, but may not, translate to the tactical level, where local groups could still disagree violently with their leaders

b. In PEO, impartiality still requires the PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, and not show preference for any faction or group over another. Because PEO will use coercive force and intervene against the will of some, many people may perceive that the PO force is not impartial. Therefore the PO force must focus information operations (IO) to counter these perceptions.

c. Restraint and Minimum Force. A misuse of force can have a negative impact upon the legitimacy of the PO. On the other hand, the appropriate use of force to prevent disruption of the peace process can strengthen consent. The PO force uses situational understanding to include cultural, sociological, religious, and ethnic aspects to determine how best to use this force. When used, force (lethal and nonlethal) should be no more than is necessary and proportionate to resolve and defuse a crisis. The force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration required to remove the threat and prevent further escalation.

(c) Peace Building. Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

(d) Peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it.

(e) Conflict Prevention. A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are often conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict

prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring.

d. Service Doctrine

(1) MAPRO is not mentioned or addressed in Service doctrine. One Service publication mentions MARO, one mentions mass atrocities, 15 mention atrocities, four publications mention protection of civilians (of which only three contained more than peripheral relevance), nine publications mention genocide and two publications mention ethnic cleansing.

(2) US Army FM 3-0, *Operations* (Change 1, 22 Feb 2011). The section on Limited Humanitarian Assistance in Chapter 2 “The Continuum of Operations” states the following: “Non-Department of Defense agencies may refer to such intervention as mass atrocity response operations.”

e. Lessons Learned. A review of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) yielded no inputs concerning MAPRO or MARO. A review of the Interagency Lessons Learned database (powered by JLLIS) produced 34 inputs for mass atrocities (of which only 9 contained more than peripheral relevance), 27 inputs for protection of civilians, 26 inputs for genocide (of which only 9 contained more than peripheral relevance), and 40 inputs for ethnic cleansing (of which only 5 contained more than peripheral relevance). None of the relevant inputs specifically discussed joint doctrine shortfalls. Six of the nine inputs were identical between mass atrocities and genocide.

f. Proposal Analysis

(1) Definition of Joint Doctrine. The purpose of joint doctrine is to guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action towards a common objective. There is no common objective in the proposal for MAPRO. The common objective when responding to a mass atrocity situation would be to maintain or restore peace and order. This is the objective of Peace Enforcement operations.

(2) Doctrinal void. The determination of a doctrinal void is also hampered by the lack of an operational objective in the proposed concept paper. There is no perceived void between the purpose of a MAPRO and that of a Stability Operation, or more specifically Peace Enforcement Operations. Peace Enforcement Operations have a clearly defined task and purpose that would meet U.S. policy objectives in a mass atrocity situation. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance also defines the unique requirements to simultaneously relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation during a Peace Enforcement Operation.

(a) Per the non-doctrinal handbook, MARO is a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants.

1. Three distinctions of a MARO situation

a. Multiparty Dynamic. A multiparty affair, complicating planning and operations with three major categories of actors- the perpetrators or violence, the victims of violence, and the interveners- interacting with results that are difficult to predict.

b. Illusion of Impartiality. The intervener may be acting for what he considers impartial reasons but the perpetrators of violence and the victims will perceive an intervening force as anything but impartial.

c. Escalatory Dynamic. The mass killing of civilians has the potential for rapid escalation based on numerous factors that raise acute challenges for an intervening force.

(b) Per JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, Peace Enforcement Operations are the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

1. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations

a. Consent. Consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement.

b. Impartiality. PO force must act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, and not show preferences. Many may perceive that the PO force is not impartial.

c. Restraint and Minimum Force. The appropriate use of force to prevent disruption of the peace process can strengthen consent. Force must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration required to remove the threat and prevent further escalation.

(3) Extant Capabilities. The proposed concept paper does not discuss the employment of existing resources or assets to meet this “emergent and evolving operational domain”. Instead the concept paper proposes the new publication to “fill the gap between the national guidance and existing DoD capabilities by providing operationally accepted and standardized terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting MAPRO”. The terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures already exist in joint doctrine for the execution of stability and peace enforcement operations.

5. **Conclusions**

- a. Based on objectives and operational considerations “Mass Atrocity Response Operations” are essentially the same as Peace Enforcement Operations.
- b. Approved policy, doctrine, and doctrine in revision contain the depth needed at the operational level to conduct planning, coordination, and execution of operations in response to a mass atrocity.
- c. There is no doctrinal void at the operational level with regard to peace enforcement operations.
- d. There is insufficient justification for developing a JP on MAPRO or MARO.
- e. Mass atrocity response considerations should be added as an appendix to JP 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (RFC JWG on 25-26 October 2011).
- f. Mass atrocity response considerations should be added to JP 3-29 *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* during upcoming revision (JDSD submitted JP 3-29 FAR to JEDD on 20 September 2011).

6. **Recommendations**

- a. Accept USEUCOM proposal to develop doctrine on MARO in an appendix on mass atrocity response to JP 3-07.3 *Peace Operations*.
- b. Add mass atrocity response considerations to JP 3-29 *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- c. A standalone JP on “Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations” is not required.